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Introduction {#sec001}
============

With the rapid growth of broadband communication, multimedia transmission has increased over the Internet, which makes information and communication systems more vulnerable. Image security has attracted a huge amount of attention due to the widespread interconnection of almost all devices and communication networks. Image encryption differs from text encryption due to bulk data capacity, high redundancy and a strong correlation between adjacent pixels.

Since Matthews \[[@pone.0184586.ref001]\] first proposed the chaos encryption algorithm in 1989, many studies have indicated that chaotic encryption are suitable for bulk data due to its favorable properties, such as complex and nonlinear, high sensitivity to initial conditions, control parameters, non-periodicity, and a pseudorandom nature.

Many image encryption algorithms \[[@pone.0184586.ref002]--[@pone.0184586.ref025]\] based on chaos have been developed in last decades to ensure the security of digital images transmission and storage. Most of them adopted permutation-diffusion mechanism \[[@pone.0184586.ref003]--[@pone.0184586.ref007], [@pone.0184586.ref011], [@pone.0184586.ref016], [@pone.0184586.ref017], [@pone.0184586.ref019], [@pone.0184586.ref021]\], in which permuting the positions of image pixels incorporates with changing gray values of image pixels to confuse the relationship between the cipher image and the plain image.

A previous study \[[@pone.0184586.ref026]\]proposed an image encryption/decryption algorithm with compound chaos mapping, in addition, a hyperchaotic system based on chaotic control parameters was put forward. Another study \[[@pone.0184586.ref027]\] presented an image encryption scheme on the foundation of multiple chaotic maps while an alternate work \[[@pone.0184586.ref028]\] proposed an image encryption algorithm on the basis of rotation matrix bit-level permutation and block diffusion. Akram Belazi proposed several image encryption schemes \[[@pone.0184586.ref023]--[@pone.0184586.ref025]\] based on chaos and obtained the good encryption effect. An encryption method on the basis of reversible cellular automata combined with chaos has also been designed in \[[@pone.0184586.ref012]\]. Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref029]\] presented a color image encryption scheme on the foundation of the quantum chaotic system.

According to the type of the key usage, encryption algorithm can be divided into symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption. The same secret key is used to encrypt and decrypt in symmetric encryption algorithms. Most chaos image encryption schemes are based on symmetric cryptographic techniques, which have been proven to be more vulnerable than an asymmetric cryptosystem \[[@pone.0184586.ref030]\].

Common symmetric encryption algorithms include DES, 3DES and AES. They are widely used due to their advantages such as great speed, relatively low complexity as well as easy implementation in hardware. Since both encryption and decryption sides should configure the key by some extra methods, once the key is divulged the cryptosystems will be broken. Furthermore, each pair of users need choose a unique key that nobody else knows. This makes the quantity of key to be growing exponentially.

Asymmetric encryption differs from symmetric encryption that it requires a key pair: a public key for encryption and a corresponding private key for decryption which is known only to the owner. The most common asymmetric encryption algorithm is RSA. In an asymmetric key cryptosystem, any user can encrypt a message using the public key of the receiver, but such a message can be decrypted only with the receiver's private key \[[@pone.0184586.ref031]\]. It is unlike symmetric encryption to share the key, asymmetric encryption do not require a secure channel for the initial exchange of the key from transmitter to receiver. Although asymmetric cryptosystem has so many advantages, it also has disadvantages. For example, it is extremely difficult to factorize large numbers in order to obtain sufficiently long keys especially enormous data.

Since Pecora and Corrall found the drive-response chaos synchronization phenomena \[[@pone.0184586.ref032]\], a lot of synchronization schemes have been proposed, such as complete synchronization, generalized synchronization, phase synchronization, lag synchronization, projective synchronization. Two chaotic systems synchronization phenomenon is similar to the asymmetric key mechanism, and they can synchronize with each other if they exchange information in just the right way. This motivates us to use chaos synchronization to avoid the key transmission in order to combine the advantage of the symmetric and asymmetric encryption and try to overcome their shortcomings.

In this paper, we propose a new color image cryptosystem using a synchronization scheme for a 3-cell QCNN \[[@pone.0184586.ref033]\] and a 6^*th*^-order CNN \[[@pone.0184586.ref034]\]. The 3-cell QCNN is regarded as the response system and the 6th order CNN is used for the drive system. In order to synchronize the drive-response system, the control law for stable synchronization errors and the update rule for unknown parameters estimation are given. The function projective synchronization \[[@pone.0184586.ref035]\] is treated as the decryption key generator. We prove that the 6^*th*^-order CNN drive system and the 3-cell QCNN response system are asymptotically synchronized. Numerical simulations and security analyses such as information entropy analysis, differential attack are performed to verify the feasibility of the proposed scheme. As similar as the asymmetric encryption, our scheme does not require exchange key, and it effectively avoids the threat of key exposure, therefore, it will be called Semi-Symmetric encryption scheme.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we briefly describe the 3-cell QCNN system and the 6^*th*^-order CNN system used in our scheme. In Section 3, the function projection synchronization between the response system and the drive system is presented. Section 4 gives the semi-symmetric encryption scheme. The experimental results and performance analyses are given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.

System descriptions {#sec002}
===================

3-cell QCNN hyperchaotic system {#sec003}
-------------------------------

Quantum dots and quantum cellular automata (QCA) \[[@pone.0184586.ref036]\] constitute new types of semiconductor nano-materials that have many unique nano-features. The k^*th*^ QCA state equation is obtained by the Schrödinger equation \[[@pone.0184586.ref036]\]: $$\begin{array}{rcl}
{i\hslash\frac{\partial}{\partial t}P_{k}} & = & {- 2\gamma\sqrt{1 - P_{k}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{k}} \\
{i\hslash\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\varphi{}_{k}} & = & {- E_{k}{\overline{P}}_{k} + 2\gamma\frac{P_{k}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{k}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{k}} \\
\end{array}$$ where ℏ is Planck's constant, *γ* is the inter-dot tunneling energy, which takes into account the neighboring polarizations, and *E*~*k*~ is the electrostatic energy cost of two adjacent fully polarized cells that have opposite polarization. The effect of local interconnections is considered in the term ${\overline{P}}_{k}$; and *φ*~*k*~ is a quantum phase of the QCA. [Eq (1)](#pone.0184586.e001){ref-type="disp-formula"} constitutes the QCNN state equations and its dynamics are characterized by two variables, *P*~*k*~ and *ϕ*~*k*~. A 3--cell QCNN system can be described as [Eq (2)](#pone.0184586.e003){ref-type="disp-formula"}: $$\begin{array}{rcl}
{\overset{˙}{P}}_{1} & = & {- 2b_{01}\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}\sin\phi_{1}} \\
{\overset{˙}{\phi}}_{1} & = & {- \omega_{01}\left( P_{1} - P_{2} - P_{3} \right) + 2b_{01}\frac{P_{1}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{1}} \\
{\overset{˙}{P}}_{2} & = & {- 2b_{02}\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}\sin\phi_{2}} \\
{\overset{˙}{\phi}}_{2} & = & {- \omega_{02}\left( P_{2} - P_{1} - P_{3} \right) + 2b_{02}\frac{P_{2}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{2}} \\
{\overset{˙}{P}}_{3} & = & {- 2b_{03}\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}\sin\phi_{3}} \\
{\overset{˙}{\phi}}_{3} & = & {- \omega_{03}\left( P_{3} - P_{1} - P_{2} \right) + 2b_{03}\frac{P_{3}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{3}} \\
\end{array}$$ where *P*~1~, *P*~2~, *P*~3~ and *ϕ*~1~, *ϕ*~2~, *ϕ*~3~ are the state variables; *b*~01~, *b*~02~, and *b*~03~ are the proportional inter--dot energy in each cell, and *ω*~01~, *ω*~02~, *ω*~03~ are effect weigh parameters on the differences in the polarization of the adjacent cells, like the cloning templates in traditional CNNs. The [Fig 1](#pone.0184586.g001){ref-type="fig"}, shows the attractor of system(2) in three dimensional space. We investigated the dynamic behavior of system(2) by calculating its Lyapunov exponents. When *b*~01~ = *b*~02~ = *b*~03~ = 0.28, *ω*~01~ = 0.5, *ω*~02~ = 0.2, and *ω*~03~ ∈ \[0, 1\], which are shown in [Fig 2](#pone.0184586.g002){ref-type="fig"}, system(2) is hyperchaotic due to three positive Lyapunov exponents.

![3-cell QCNN system partial attractor distribution.](pone.0184586.g001){#pone.0184586.g001}

![3-cell QCNN system Lyapunov exponents spectrum with *b*~01~ = *b*~02~ = *b*~03~ = 0.28, *ω*~01~ = 0.5, *ω*~02~ = 0.2, and *ω*~03~ ∈ \[0, 1\].](pone.0184586.g002){#pone.0184586.g002}

6^*th*^-order CNN hyperchaotic system {#sec004}
-------------------------------------

The 6^*th*^-order CNN is another hyperchaotic system used in this paper, which is introduced in Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref034]\], and it is all the interconnection in a CNN. Its state equation is defined as [Eq (3)](#pone.0184586.e004){ref-type="disp-formula"}: $$\begin{array}{r}
{\frac{dx_{i}}{dt} = - x_{j} + a_{j}p_{j} + \sum_{\begin{matrix}
{k = 1} \\
{k \neq j} \\
\end{matrix}}^{6}a_{j,k}p_{k} + \sum_{k = 1}^{6}s_{jk}x_{k} + i_{j}\left( j = 1,2,...,6 \right)} \\
\end{array}$$ where $$\begin{array}{r}
\begin{array}{l}
{a_{j} = 0\left( j = 1,2,3,5,6 \right),a_{4} = 200;} \\
{a_{jk} = 0\left( j,k = 1,2,...,6;j \neq k \right);} \\
{s_{12} = s_{21} = s_{24} = s_{34} = s_{42} = s_{43} = s_{53} = s_{54} = s_{55} = s_{56} = s_{61} = s_{63} = s_{64} = 0;} \\
{i_{j} = 0\left( j = 1,2,...,6 \right);} \\
{s_{11} = s_{23} = s_{33} = s_{51} = 1;s_{13} = s_{14} = - 1;} \\
{s_{22} = 3,s_{31} = 14,s_{32} = - 14,s_{41} = s_{62} = 100,s_{44} = - 99,s_{52} = 18,s_{65} = 4,s_{66} = - 3;} \\
\end{array} \\
\end{array}$$

[Eq (3)](#pone.0184586.e004){ref-type="disp-formula"} could be calculted as [Eq (4)](#pone.0184586.e006){ref-type="disp-formula"}: $$\begin{array}{rcl}
{\overset{˙}{x}}_{1} & = & {- x_{3} - x_{4}} \\
{\overset{˙}{x}}_{2} & = & {2x_{2} + x_{3}} \\
{\overset{˙}{x}}_{3} & = & {14x_{1} - 14x_{2}} \\
{\overset{˙}{x}}_{4} & = & {100x_{1} - 100x_{4} + 200p{}_{4}} \\
{\overset{˙}{x}}_{5} & = & {18x_{2} + x_{1} - x_{5}} \\
{\overset{˙}{x}}_{6} & = & {4x_{5} - 4x_{6} + 100x_{2}} \\
\end{array}$$ where *p*~4~ = 0.5(\|*x*~4~ + 1\| − \|*x*~4~ − 1\|).

We calculated the Lyapunov exponents of system(4). When *t* → ∞, the six Lyapunov exponents are *λ*~1~ = 2.748, *λ*~2~ = −2.9844, *λ*~3~ = 1.2411, *λ*~4~ = −14.4549, *λ*~5~ = −1.4123 and *λ*~6~ = −83.2282. Two of these exponents are positive, so system(4) is also hyperchaotic. [Fig 3](#pone.0184586.g003){ref-type="fig"} shows system(4)'s partial chaotic attractor distribution.

![6^*th*^-order CNN partial chaotic attractor distribution.](pone.0184586.g003){#pone.0184586.g003}

The synchronized key generation system {#sec005}
--------------------------------------

Let System(4) and System(2) be the drive system and the response system, respectively. Thus, the system(2) can be described by the [Eq (5)](#pone.0184586.e007){ref-type="disp-formula"} via the function projective synchronization \[[@pone.0184586.ref035]\]: $$\begin{array}{rcl}
{\overset{˙}{P}}_{r1} & = & {- 2b_{11}\sqrt{1 - P_{r1}^{2}}\sin\phi_{r1} + u_{1}} \\
{\overset{˙}{\phi}}_{r1} & = & {- \omega_{11}\left( P_{r1} - P_{r2} - P_{r3} \right) + 2b_{11}\frac{P_{r1}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{r1}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{r1} + u_{2}} \\
{\overset{˙}{P}}_{r2} & = & {- 2b_{12}\sqrt{1 - P_{r2}^{2}}\sin\phi_{r2} + u_{3}} \\
{\overset{˙}{\phi}}_{r2} & = & {- \omega_{12}\left( P_{r2} - P_{r1} - P_{r3} \right) + 2b_{12}\frac{P_{r2}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{r2}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{r2} + u_{4}} \\
{\overset{˙}{P}}_{r3} & = & {- 2b_{13}\sqrt{1 - P_{r3}^{2}}\sin\phi_{r3} + u_{5}} \\
{\overset{˙}{\phi}}_{r3} & = & {- \omega_{13}\left( P_{r3} - P_{r1} - P_{r2} \right) + 2b_{13}\frac{P_{r3}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{r3}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{r3} + u_{6}} \\
\end{array}$$ where *b*~11~, *b*~12~, *b*~13~, *ω*~11~, *ω*~12~ and *ω*~13~ are the parameters of response system(5) that need to be estimated in order to synchronize system(4) and system(5), and *u*~1~, *u*~2~, *u*~3~, *u*~4~, *u*~5~ and *u*~6~ are the controllers. Define synchronization error states as follows: $$\begin{array}{r}
{{\overset{˙}{e}}_{i} = {\overset{˙}{y}}_{i} - \alpha\left( t \right){\overset{˙}{x}}_{i} - \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)x_{i},i = 1,2,3,4,5,6} \\
\end{array}$$ which ${\overset{˙}{e}}_{i}$ denotes the deviation between system(4) and system(5), when ${\overset{˙}{e}}_{i}$ converges to zero as time tends to infinity $\lim\limits_{t\rightarrow\infty}{||}e_{i}{||} = \lim\limits_{t\rightarrow\infty}{||}y_{i} - \alpha\left( t \right)x_{i}{||} = 0,i = 1,2,3,4,5,6\,$, *α*(*t*) as the scaling function factor, drive system and response system reach synchronization. Substituting Eqs ([2](#pone.0184586.e003){ref-type="disp-formula"}), ([4](#pone.0184586.e006){ref-type="disp-formula"}) and ([5](#pone.0184586.e007){ref-type="disp-formula"}) into [Eq (6)](#pone.0184586.e008){ref-type="disp-formula"} yields the error dynamical system(7) as defined in [Eq (7)](#pone.0184586.e012){ref-type="disp-formula"} between system(4) and system(5): $$\begin{array}{ccl}
{\overset{˙}{e}}_{1} & = & {- 2b_{11}\sqrt{1 - P_{r1}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{r1} + u_{1} - \alpha\left( t \right)\left( - 2b_{01}\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{1} \right) - \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)P_{1}} \\
{\overset{˙}{e}}_{2} & = & {- \omega_{11}\left( P_{r1} - P_{r2} - P_{r3} \right) + 2b_{11}\frac{P_{r1}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{r1}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{r1} + u_{2}} \\
 & & {- \alpha\left( t \right)\left\lbrack {- \omega_{01}\left( P_{1} - P_{2} - P_{3} \right) + 2b_{01}\frac{P_{1}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{1}} \right\rbrack - \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)\varphi_{1}} \\
{\overset{˙}{e}}_{3} & = & {- 2b_{12}\sqrt{1 - P_{r2}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{r2} + u_{3} - \alpha\left( t \right)\left( - 2b_{02}\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{2} \right) - \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)P_{2}} \\
{\overset{˙}{e}}_{4} & = & {- \omega_{12}\left( P_{r2} - P_{r1} - P_{r3} \right) + 2b_{12}\frac{P_{r2}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{r2}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{r2} + u_{4}} \\
 & & {- \alpha\left( t \right)\left\lbrack {- \omega_{02}\left( P_{2} - P_{1} - P_{3} \right) + 2b_{02}\frac{P_{2}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{2}} \right\rbrack - \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)\varphi_{2}} \\
{\overset{˙}{e}}_{5} & = & {- 2b_{13}\sqrt{1 - P_{r3}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{r3} + u_{5} - \alpha\left( t \right)\left( - 2b_{03}\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{3} \right) - \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)P_{3}} \\
{\overset{˙}{e}}_{6} & = & {- \omega_{13}\left( P_{r3} - P_{r1} - P_{r2} \right) + 2b_{13}\frac{P_{r3}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{r3}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{r3} + u_{6}} \\
 & & {- \alpha\left( t \right)\left\lbrack {- \omega_{03}\left( P_{3} - P_{1} - P_{2} \right) + 2b_{03}\frac{P_{3}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{3}} \right\rbrack - \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)\varphi_{3}} \\
\end{array}$$

We design the control law *u*~*i*~(*i* = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) as [Eq (8)](#pone.0184586.e013){ref-type="disp-formula"} to make the synchronization errors *e*~1~, *e*~2~, *e*~3~, *e*~4~, *e*~5~, and *e*~6~ to stabilize at the origin. $$\begin{array}{ccl}
u_{1} & = & {2b_{11}\left\lbrack {\sqrt{1 - P_{r1}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{r1} - \alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{1}} \right\rbrack + \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)P_{1} - k_{1}e_{1}} \\
u_{2} & = & {\omega_{11}\left\lbrack {\left( P_{r1} - P_{r2} - P_{r3} \right) - \alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{1} - P_{2} - P_{3} \right)} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {- 2b_{11}\left\lbrack {\frac{P_{r1}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{r1}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{r1} - \alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{1}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{1}} \right\rbrack + \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)\varphi_{1} - k_{2}e_{2}} \\
u_{3} & = & {2b_{12}\left\lbrack {\sqrt{1 - P_{r2}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{r2} - \alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{2}} \right\rbrack + \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)P_{2} - k_{3}e_{3}} \\
u_{4} & = & {\omega_{12}\left\lbrack {\left( P_{r2} - P_{r1} - P_{r3} \right) - \alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{2} - P_{1} - P_{3} \right)} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {- 2b_{12}\left\lbrack {\frac{P_{r2}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{r2}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{r2} - \alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{2}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{2}} \right\rbrack + \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)\varphi_{2} - k_{4}e_{4}} \\
u_{5} & = & {2b_{13}\left\lbrack {\sqrt{1 - P_{r3}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{r3} - \alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}\sin\varphi_{3}} \right\rbrack + \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)P_{3} - k_{5}e_{5}} \\
u_{6} & = & {\omega_{13}\left\lbrack {\left( P_{r3} - P_{r1} - P_{r2} \right) - \alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{3} - P_{1} - P_{2} \right)} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {- 2b_{13}\left\lbrack {\frac{P_{r3}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{r3}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{r3} - \alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{3}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}}\cos\varphi_{3}} \right\rbrack + \overset{˙}{\alpha}\left( t \right)\varphi_{3} - k_{6}e_{6}} \\
\end{array}$$

Furthermore, the update rule for the six unknown parameters *b*~11~, *b*~12~, *b*~13~, *ω*~11~, *ω*~12~, and *ω*~13~ are [Eq (9)](#pone.0184586.e014){ref-type="disp-formula"} defined as follows: $$\begin{array}{rcl}
{\overset{˙}{b}}_{11} & = & {2\alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}\sin\phi_{1}e_{1} - 2\alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{1}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{1}e_{2} - k_{7}e_{a}} \\
{\overset{˙}{\omega}}_{11} & = & {\alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{1} - P_{2} - P_{3} \right)e_{2} - k_{8}e_{b}} \\
{\overset{˙}{b}}_{12} & = & {2\alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}\sin\phi_{2}e_{3} - 2\alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{2}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{2}e_{4} - k_{9}e_{c}} \\
{\overset{˙}{\omega}}_{12} & = & {\alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{2} - P_{1} - P_{3} \right)e_{4} - k_{10}e_{d}} \\
{\overset{˙}{b}}_{13} & = & {2\alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}\sin\phi_{3}e_{5} - 2\alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{3}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{3}e_{6} - k_{11}e_{e}} \\
{\overset{˙}{\omega}}_{13} & = & {\alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{3} - P_{1} - P_{2} \right)e_{6} - k_{12}e_{f}} \\
\end{array}$$

Where *k*~*i*~ \> 0(*i* = 1, 2, 3, ..., 12), and *e*~*a*~ = *b*~11~−*b*~01~, *e*~*b*~ = *ω*~11~ − *ω*~01~, *e*~*c*~ = *b*~12~ − *b*~02~, *e*~*d*~ = *ω*~12~ − *ω*~02~, *e*~*e*~ = *b*~13~ − *b*~03~, *e*~*f*~ = *ω*~13~ − *ω*~03~.

**Theorem.** For a given nonzero scaling function factor *α*(*t*), it can make response system(5) and drive system(4) to synchronize by the control law [Eq (8)](#pone.0184586.e013){ref-type="disp-formula"} and the update rule [Eq (9)](#pone.0184586.e014){ref-type="disp-formula"}.

**Proof.** Choose the following Lyapunov function: $$\begin{array}{r}
{V = \frac{1}{2}\left( e_{1}^{2} + e_{2}^{2} + e_{3}^{2} + e_{4}^{2} + e_{5}^{2} + e_{6}^{2} + e_{a}^{2} + e_{b}^{2} + e_{c}^{2} + e_{d}^{2} + e_{e}^{2} + e_{f}^{2} \right)} \\
\end{array}$$

The time derivative of V along the trajectory of the error system(6) is $$\begin{array}{r}
{\overset{˙}{V} = \left( e_{1}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{1} + e_{2}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{2} + e_{3}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{3} + e_{4}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{4} + e_{5}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{5} + e_{6}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{6} + e_{a}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{a} + e_{b}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{b} + e_{c}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{c} + e_{d}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{d} + e_{e}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{e} + e_{f}{\overset{˙}{e}}_{f} \right),} \\
\end{array}$$ $$\begin{array}{ccl}
\overset{˙}{V} & = & {e_{1}\left\lbrack {- 2\left( b_{11} - b_{01} \right)\alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}\sin\phi_{1} - k_{1}e_{1}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{2}\left\lbrack {- \left( \omega_{11} - \omega_{01} \right)\alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{1} - P_{2} - P_{3} \right) + 2\left( b_{11} - b_{01} \right)\alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{1}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{1} - k_{2}e_{2}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{3}\left\lbrack {- 2\left( b_{12} - b_{02} \right)\alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}\sin\phi_{2} - k_{3}e_{3}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{4}\left\lbrack {- \left( \omega_{12} - \omega_{02} \right)\alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{2} - P_{1} - P_{3} \right) + 2\left( b_{12} - b_{02} \right)\alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{2}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{2} - k_{4}e_{4}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{5}\left\lbrack {- 2\left( b_{13} - b_{03} \right)\alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}\sin\phi_{3} - k_{5}e_{5}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{6}\left\lbrack {- \left( \omega_{13} - \omega_{03} \right)\alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{3} - P_{1} - P_{2} \right) + 2\left( b_{13} - b_{03} \right)\alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{3}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{3} - k_{6}e_{6}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{a}\left\lbrack {2\alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}\sin\phi_{1}e_{1} - 2\alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{1}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{1}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{1}e_{2} - k_{7}e_{a}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{b}\left\lbrack {\alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{1} - P_{2} - P_{3} \right)e_{2} - k_{8}e_{b}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{c}\left\lbrack {2\alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}\sin\phi_{2}e_{3} - 2\alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{2}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{2}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{2}e_{4} - k_{9}e_{c}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{d}\left\lbrack {\alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{2} - P_{1} - P_{3} \right)e_{4} - k_{10}e_{d}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{e}\left\lbrack {2\alpha\left( t \right)\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}\sin\phi_{3}e_{5} - 2\alpha\left( t \right)\frac{P_{3}}{\sqrt{1 - P_{3}^{2}}}\cos\phi_{3}e_{6} - k_{11}e_{e}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & & {+ e_{f}\left\lbrack {\alpha\left( t \right)\left( P_{3} - P_{1} - P_{2} \right)e_{6} - k_{12}e_{f}} \right\rbrack} \\
 & = & {- k_{1}e_{1}^{2} - k_{2}e_{1}^{2} - k_{3}e_{3}^{2} - k_{4}e_{4}^{2} - k_{5}e_{5}^{2} - k_{6}e_{6}^{2} - k_{7}e_{a}^{2} - k_{8}e_{b}^{2} - k_{9}e_{c}^{2} - k_{10}e_{d}^{2}} \\
 & & {- k_{11}e_{e}^{2} - k_{12}e_{f}^{2}} \\
 & = & {- e^{T}Ke} \\
\end{array}$$ where *e* = (*e*~1~, *e*~2~, *e*~3~, *e*~4~, *e*~5~, *e*~6~, *e*~*a*~, *e*~*b*~, *e*~*c*~, *e*~*d*~, *e*~*e*~, *e*~*f*~)^*T*^, and *K* = *diag*(*k*~1~, *k*~2~, *k*~3~, *k*~4~, *k*~5~, *k*~6~, *k*~7~, *k*~8~, *k*~9~, *k*~10~, *k*~11~, *k*~12~)^*T*^

Because $\overset{˙}{V} \leq 0\,$, we have *e*~1~, *e*~2~, *e*~3~, *e*~4~, *e*~5~, *e*~6~, *e*~*a*~, *e*~*b*~, *e*~*c*~, *e*~*d*~, *e*~*e*~, *e*~*f*~ → 0 as *t* → ∞. i.e.,$\lim\limits_{t\rightarrow\infty}\left| \middle| e \middle| \right| = 0$. Proof completed.

Simulation is performed in order to evaluate the feasibly and effectiveness of the proposed control law and the update rule for the 3-cell QCNN and 6^*th*^-order CNN synchronization method. The initial values and control parameters of the drive and the response system for a time-step of 0.1 are shown in [Table 1](#pone.0184586.t001){ref-type="table"}.

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t001

###### Initial values and control parameters of drive and response system.

![](pone.0184586.t001){#pone.0184586.t001g}

  Drive system        Response system          Control parameters of Response system
  ------------------- ------------------------ ---------------------------------------
  *x*~1~(0) = −0.92   *P*~*r*1~(0) = 0.1901    *b*~11~ = 0.5
  *x*~2~(0) = 1.41    *ϕ*~*r*1~(0) = −184.3    *ω*~11~ = 0.6
  *x*~3~(0) = −1.53   *P*~*r*2~(0) = 0.123     *b*~12~ = 0.4
  *x*~4~(0) = 0.48    *ϕ*~*r*2~(0) = −147.3    *ω*~12~ = 0.7
  *x*~5~(0) = 0.37    *P*~*r*3~(0) = 0.113     *b*~13~ = 0.7
  *x*~6~(0) = −1.21   *ϕ*~*r*3~(0) = −197.85   *ω*~13~ = 0.5

In addition, the scaling function *α*(*t*) = 0.5 + 0.1 sin(*t*) and the control gains are defined as (*k*~1~, *k*~2~, *k*~3~, *k*~4~, *k*~5~, *k*~6~, *k*~7~, *k*~8~, *k*~9~, *k*~10~, *k*~11~, *k*~12~) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1).

The simulations results are illustrated in Figs [4](#pone.0184586.g004){ref-type="fig"} and [5](#pone.0184586.g005){ref-type="fig"}. [Fig 4](#pone.0184586.g004){ref-type="fig"} shows that the errors *e*~1~, *e*~2~, *e*~3~, *e*~4~, *e*~5~, and *e*~6~ approach zero. [Fig 5](#pone.0184586.g005){ref-type="fig"} shows that the estimated unknown parameters converge to *b*~11~ → 0.28, *ω*~11~ → 0.4, *b*~12~ → 0.28, *ω*~12~ → 0.35, *b*~13~ → 0.28, and *ω*~13~ → 0.25 as *t* → ∞. When t = 10, synchronization errors close 0 and unknown control parameters reach stability, which shows that the synchronization method is efficient.

![Error signals between the drive and the response system.](pone.0184586.g004){#pone.0184586.g004}

![Estimated values for unknown parameters.](pone.0184586.g005){#pone.0184586.g005}

The semi-symmetric image encryption scheme {#sec006}
==========================================

In this paper, we propose a semi-symmetric image encryption/decryption scheme based on the function projective synchronization. The proposed scheme is illustrated in [Fig 6](#pone.0184586.g006){ref-type="fig"}. The scheme is deployed at the ends of Alice and Bob, respectively. Firstly, Alice adopts system(2) with initial parameters and control parameters to obtain the key. Bob adopts system(5) to obtain the key independently. Function projective synchronization ensures that Alice and Bob get the equivalent key. Secondly, Alice encrypts the plain image by his key and transmits the cipher image to Bob. Thirdly, Bob decrypts the cipher image with his key.

![Semi-symmetric image encryption/decryption scheme.](pone.0184586.g006){#pone.0184586.g006}

The proposed scheme is different with symmetric algorithms that Alice and Bob use in different key generation systems. The symmetric algorithms transmit the key by some extra security methods. The proposed scheme is similar to asymmetric algorithms that the keys generated by the two systems need not transmit to each other over other security link, which prevents security key leakage during the transmission.

Our scheme is a hybrid chaotic encryption algorithm. It consists of a scrambling stage and a diffusion stage. In encryption phase, 3-cell QCNN system(2) is used for scrambling and diffusing the plain image. In decryption phase, since the function projective synchronization is used to synchronize the response system(5) and drive system(4), the 6^*th*^-order CNN drive system(4) with control laws(8) and update rules(9) generates the key to decrypt the cipher image.

Encryption algorithm {#sec007}
--------------------

This encryption flowchart is presented in [Fig 7](#pone.0184586.g007){ref-type="fig"}.

![Encryption flowchart.](pone.0184586.g007){#pone.0184586.g007}

The 3-cell QCNN system(2) is the encryption key generator. The initial conditions *ϕ*~1~(0), *ϕ*~2~(0), *ϕ*~3~(0), *P*~1~(0), *P*~2~(0), and *P*~3~(0) and control parameters *b*~01~, *b*~02~, *b*~03~, *ω*~01~, *ω*~02~, and *ω*~03~ are used to iterate system(2) M times. The results are *ϕ*~1~, *ϕ*~1~, *ϕ*~3~, *P*~1~, *P*~2~, and *P*~3~ encryption keys. In the scrambling stage, the Arnold mapping \[[@pone.0184586.ref037]\] defined that [Eq (10)](#pone.0184586.e020){ref-type="disp-formula"} is used to scramble the three color components of the plain color image. $$\begin{array}{r}
{\left( \begin{array}{l}
x_{n + 1} \\
y_{n + 1} \\
\end{array} \right) = A\left( \begin{array}{l}
x_{n} \\
y_{n} \\
\end{array} \right)\text{mod}\left( N \right) = \left\lbrack \begin{array}{ll}
1 & p \\
q & {pq + 1} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack\left( \begin{array}{l}
x_{n} \\
y_{n} \\
\end{array} \right)\text{mod}\left( N \right)} \\
\end{array}$$

Since det(*A*) = 1, the parameters are described as follows: $$\begin{array}{rcl}
p_{r} & = & {floor\left( \text{mod}\left( \phi_{1} \times 2^{24} \right),N \right)} \\
q_{r} & = & {floor\left( \text{mod}\left( \text{mod}\left( \phi_{1} \times 2^{48} \right),2^{24} \right),N \right)} \\
p_{g} & = & {floor\left( \text{mod}\left( \phi_{2} \times 2^{24} \right),N \right)} \\
q_{g} & = & {floor\left( \text{mod}\left( \text{mod}\left( \phi_{2} \times 2^{48} \right),2^{24} \right),N \right)} \\
p_{b} & = & {floor\left( \text{mod}\left( \phi_{3} \times 2^{24} \right),N \right)} \\
q_{b} & = & {floor\left( \text{mod}\left( \text{mod}\left( \phi_{3} \times 2^{48} \right),2^{24} \right),N \right)} \\
\end{array}$$

The iterations of Arnold mappings are $$\begin{array}{rc}
{t_{j} = floor\left( \left( \left( \text{mod}\left( \phi_{j} \times 2^{24} \right) + \text{mod}\left( \phi_{j} \times 2^{48} \right) \right),2^{24} \right),N \right)} & {j \in \left\{ r,g,b \right\}} \\
\end{array}$$

The plain image is scrambled by [Eq (10)](#pone.0184586.e020){ref-type="disp-formula"} in order to generate the permutation image. It is transformed into three 1 × (*N* × *N*) streams *S*~*j*~ = {*S*~*j*~(1), *S*~*j*~(2), ......*S*~*j*~(*N* × *N*)}, *j* ∈ {*r*, *g*, *b*} by arranging its pixels from top to bottom and left to right.

In the diffusion stage, 6^*th*^-order CNN system(4) is used to diffuse the image, which changes the permutation image pixel's values. The initial conditions are described as follows: $$\begin{array}{r}
{x_{i}\left( 0 \right) = \gamma_{i}P_{j},\left( i = 1,2,3,4,5,6 j = 1,2,3 \right)} \\
\end{array}$$

Of these initial conditions, *γ*~*i*~ is taken as the appropriate integer. *P*~*j*~ is chaotic value, so the initial conditions *x*~*i*~(0) is also chaotic value. Let the plain image be an N × N image.

The 6^*th*^-CNN is iterated $\frac{N \times N}{2}$ times and its result is divided into three matrices:*X*~*r*~, *X*~*g*~, and *X*~*b*~: $$\begin{array}{rcl}
X_{r} & = & {\begin{bmatrix}
{X_{1}\left( 1 \right)} & {X_{2}\left( 1 \right)} \\
{X_{1}\left( 2 \right)} & {X_{2}\left( 2 \right)} \\
 \vdots & \vdots \\
{X_{1}\left( \frac{N \times N}{2} \right)} & {X_{2}\left( \frac{N \times N}{2} \right)} \\
\end{bmatrix},X_{g} = \begin{bmatrix}
{X_{3}\left( 1 \right)} & {X_{4}\left( 1 \right)} \\
{X_{3}\left( 2 \right)} & {X_{4}\left( 2 \right)} \\
 \vdots & \vdots \\
{X_{3}\left( \frac{N \times N}{2} \right)} & {X_{4}\left( \frac{N \times N}{2} \right)} \\
\end{bmatrix},} \\
X_{b} & = & {\begin{bmatrix}
{X_{5}\left( 1 \right)} & {X_{6}\left( 1 \right)} \\
{X_{5}\left( 2 \right)} & {X_{6}\left( 2 \right)} \\
 \vdots & \vdots \\
{X_{5}\left( \frac{N \times N}{2} \right)} & {X_{6}\left( \frac{N \times N}{2} \right)} \\
\end{bmatrix}.} \\
\end{array}$$

Arranging matrix elements from top to bottom and from left to right, *X*~*r*~, *X*~*g*~, and *X*~*b*~ are transformed into three 1 × (*N* × *N*) streams: $$\begin{array}{r}
{X_{j}\_ Stream\left( i \right),\left( i = 1,2,...,N \times N j \in \left\{ {r,g,b} \right\} \right)} \\
\end{array}$$

The diffusion key streams, *K*~*j*~, are generated by using sequences *X*~*j*~\_*Stream* and *S*~*j*~ as described by [Eq (12)](#pone.0184586.e027){ref-type="disp-formula"}: $$\begin{array}{ccl}
{K_{j}\left( i \right)} & = & {{\text{mod}\left\{ round\lbrack \right.}\left( abs\left( X_{j}\_ Stream\left( i \right) \right) - floor\left( abs\left( X_{j}\_ Stream\left( i \right) \right) \right) \right) \times 10^{14}} \\
 & & {+ S_{j}\left( i - 1 \right){\rbrack\left. ,N \right\}}\mspace{600mu}\mspace{600mu} i = 1,2,......,N \times N,j \in \left\{ r,g,b \right\}} \\
\end{array}$$

Let *S*~*j*~(0) = 127. The scramble image is shifted to the cipher image by key streams, *K*~*j*~. $$\begin{array}{r}
\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{C_{r}\left( i \right) = bitxor\left( S_{g}\left( i \right),K_{r}\left( i \right) \right)} \\
{C_{g}\left( i \right) = bitxor\left( S_{b}\left( i \right),K_{g}\left( i \right) \right)} \\
{C_{b}\left( i \right) = bitxor\left( S_{r}\left( i \right),K_{b}\left( i \right) \right)} \\
\end{array} \right. \\
\end{array}$$

*i* = 1, 2, ......, *N* × *N*, bitxor(.) function returns the bitwise exclusive OR value of two integers.

These *C*~*r*~, *C*~*g*~, and *C*~*b*~ row vectors are transformed into *N* × *N* matrix. Compose the three color components to obtain the encrypted image.

Decryption algorithm {#sec008}
--------------------

As shown in [Fig 8](#pone.0184586.g008){ref-type="fig"}, the decryption is the inverse process of the encryption, except that the decryption key *P*~*r*1~, *P*~*r*2~, *P*~*r*3~, *ϕ*~*r*1~, *ϕ*~*r*2~, and *ϕ*~*r*3~ are generated by the synchronized key generation system instead of 3-cell QCNN(2).

![Decryption flowchart.](pone.0184586.g008){#pone.0184586.g008}

Performance analysis {#sec009}
====================

In this section, we perform 11 experiments to validate the proposed scheme. The results show that our scheme has good encryption performance.

Key space analysis {#sec010}
------------------

The key space size is the total number of different keys that can be applied in the encryption process. The key space must be large enough to make brute-attacks infeasible. Stinson DR. \[[@pone.0184586.ref038]\] suggested that the key space should be at least 2^100^ to ensure a high level security. In our algorithm there are twelve parameters for the keys: six initial conditions P~1~, Φ~1~, P~2~, Φ~2~, P~3~, Φ~3~ and six control parameters $\text{b}_{01},\text{b}_{02},\text{b}_{03},\omega_{01},\omega_{02},\omega_{03}$. They are all floating point numbers. According to the IEEE floating-point standard \[[@pone.0184586.ref039]\], the computational precision of the 64-bit double-precision numbers is 2^---52^. So the key space of the proposed encryption method is (2^52^)^12^ = 2^624^, which is sufficiently large enough to resist all kinds of brute-force attacks.

Key sensitivity analysis {#sec011}
------------------------

A secure encryption algorithm must be sensitivity to its keys which satisfies the requirement of resisting brute-force attack. Under the same experiment condition as [Eq (13)](#pone.0184586.e030){ref-type="disp-formula"}. *P*~1~(0), *P*~2~(0), *P*~3~(0), *ϕ*~1~(0), *ϕ*~2~(0), *ϕ*~3~(0) are QCNN system(2) initial conditions, used as user keys in the proposed encryption scheme. $$\begin{array}{r}
{Key = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{P_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.131;P_{2}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.135;P_{3}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.123;} \\
{\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 184.9;\phi_{2}\left( 0 \right) = 147.3414;\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 196.852;} \\
{b_{01} = b_{01} = b_{01} = 0.28;} \\
{\omega_{01} = 0.5;\omega_{02} = 0.2;\omega_{03} = 0.3;} \\
\end{array} \right\}} \\
\end{array}$$ With a tiny difference in the encryption keys, six groups of test cases are designed, which differ 10^---13^ to every encryption key, respectively. $$\begin{array}{rcl}
{Key1} & = & \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{P_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.131 + 10^{- 13};P_{2}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.135;P_{3}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.123;} \\
{\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 184.9;\phi_{2}\left( 0 \right) = 147.3414;\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 196.852;} \\
{b_{01} = b_{01} = b_{01} = 0.28;} \\
{\omega_{01} = 0.5;\omega_{02} = 0.2;\omega_{03} = 0.3;} \\
\end{array} \right\} \\
{Key2} & = & \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{P_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.131;P_{2}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.135 + 10^{- 13};P_{3}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.123;} \\
{\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 184.9;\phi_{2}\left( 0 \right) = 147.3414;\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 196.852;} \\
{b_{01} = b_{01} = b_{01} = 0.28;} \\
{\omega_{01} = 0.5;\omega_{02} = 0.2;\omega_{03} = 0.3;} \\
\end{array} \right\} \\
{Key3} & = & \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{P_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.131;P_{2}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.135;P_{3}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.123 + 10^{- 13};} \\
{\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 184.9;\phi_{2}\left( 0 \right) = 147.3414;\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 196.852;} \\
{b_{01} = b_{01} = b_{01} = 0.28;} \\
{\omega_{01} = 0.5;\omega_{02} = 0.2;\omega_{03} = 0.3;} \\
\end{array} \right\} \\
{Key4} & = & \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{P_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.131;P_{2}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.135;P_{3}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.123;} \\
{\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 184.9 + 10^{- 13};\phi_{2}\left( 0 \right) = 147.3414;\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 196.852;} \\
{b_{01} = b_{01} = b_{01} = 0.28;} \\
{\omega_{01} = 0.5;\omega_{02} = 0.2;\omega_{03} = 0.3;} \\
\end{array} \right\} \\
{Key5} & = & \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{P_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.131;P_{2}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.135;P_{3}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.123;} \\
{\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 184.9;\phi_{2}\left( 0 \right) = 147.3414 + 10^{- 13};\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 196.852;} \\
{b_{01} = b_{01} = b_{01} = 0.28;} \\
{\omega_{01} = 0.5;\omega_{02} = 0.2;\omega_{03} = 0.3;} \\
\end{array} \right\} \\
{Key6} & = & \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{P_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.131;P_{2}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.135;P_{3}\left( 0 \right) = - 0.123;} \\
{\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 184.9;\phi_{2}\left( 0 \right) = 147.3414;\phi_{1}\left( 0 \right) = - 196.852 + 10^{- 13};} \\
{b_{01} = b_{01} = b_{01} = 0.28;} \\
{\omega_{01} = 0.5;\omega_{02} = 0.2;\omega_{03} = 0.3;} \\
\end{array} \right\} \\
\end{array}$$ [Table 2](#pone.0184586.t002){ref-type="table"} lists the percentage of different pixels in RGB color component using Key or Key1, Key2, ..., Key6 seven encrypt images, respectively. Therefore, it can be concluded the slightly deviation in the key brings out absolutely different in the corresponding encryption images. Consequently, the proposed scheme has a high key sensitivity and can resist the brute-force attack.

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t002

###### Percentage of different pixels in RGB color component using Key or Key1, Key2, ..., Key6 encrypted images.

![](pone.0184586.t002){#pone.0184586.t002g}

  Image color component   Key1      Key2      Key3      Key4      Key5      Key6
  ----------------------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
  Airplane Red            99.5956   99.6155   99.5834   99.646    99.5895   99.588
  Airplane Green          99.588    99.5911   99.5895   99.5911   99.5911   99.6262
  Airplane Blue           99.5743   99.6033   99.6216   99.5941   99.6155   99.5941
  Cablecar Red            99.6094   99.6185   99.6231   99.6002   99.6048   99.6353
  Cablecar Green          99.5895   99.6017   99.5987   99.5926   99.6170   99.5941
  Cablecar Blue           99.5865   99.5972   99.5926   99.6201   99.5880   99.5789
  Cornfield Red           99.6567   99.6170   99.6307   99.5972   99.6002   99.5804
  Cornfield Green         99.6109   99.6063   99.6109   99.6124   99.5804   99.6323
  Cornfield Blue          99.6033   99.5850   99.5895   99.6277   99.5499   99.6063
  Peppers Red             99.6124   99.5926   99.6246   99.6078   99.6124   99.6231
  Peppers Green           99.6338   99.614    99.588    99.6231   99.5438   99.5804
  Peppers Blue            99.6063   99.614    99.5636   99.6033   99.6429   99.5605
  Boat Red                99.6017   99.5926   99.5911   99.6048   99.6078   99.588
  Boat Green              99.6033   99.6155   99.6399   99.6658   99.5712   99.5834
  Boat Blue               99.588    99.5834   99.6246   99.6109   99.588    99.5804
  Fruits Red              99.5743   99.5804   99.6384   99.6460   99.6307   99.5865
  Fruits Green            99.6201   99.6155   99.5834   99.6506   99.6490   99.5758
  Fruits Blue             99.6414   99.6307   99.5712   99.6155   99.6140   99.5987
  Yacht Red               99.5880   99.5850   99.6124   99.5911   99.6582   99.6078
  Yacht Green             99.5728   99.6521   99.5911   99.6170   99.5758   99.6155
  Yacht Blue              99.6521   99.5956   99.6155   99.6429   99.6307   99.5941

Histogram analysis {#sec012}
------------------

A good image encryption approach should always generate the uniform histogram of cipher image for any plain image. The plain images, cipher images, decrypted images, and the histograms of their three-color components are shown in Figs [9](#pone.0184586.g009){ref-type="fig"}--[12](#pone.0184586.g012){ref-type="fig"}. As illustrated, the histograms of the encrypted images are fairly uniform and significantly different from the respective histograms of the original images. Hence, our proposed scheme does not provide any clue to statistical attacks.

!["Flower" original, cipher image and decrypted image.](pone.0184586.g009){#pone.0184586.g009}

![Three color component histograms of "Flower" original, encrypted and decrypted image.](pone.0184586.g010){#pone.0184586.g010}

!["Cablecar" original, encrypted and decrypted image.](pone.0184586.g011){#pone.0184586.g011}

![Three color component histograms of "Cablecar" original, encrypted and decrypted image.](pone.0184586.g012){#pone.0184586.g012}

Correlation coefficient analysis {#sec013}
--------------------------------

To test the correlation of pixels (vertical, horizontal, diagonal), we randomly select 4000 adjacent pairs of the plain image and the cipher image, and calculated the correlation coefficients of pixels, according to the following formula: $$\begin{array}{rcl}
{e\left( x \right)} & = & {\frac{1}{N}\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}x_{i}} \\
{d\left( x \right)} & = & {\frac{1}{N}\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}\left( x_{i} - e\left( x \right) \right)^{2}} \\
{\text{cov}\left( x,y \right)} & = & {\frac{1}{N}\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N}{\left( x_{i} - e\left( x \right) \right)\left( y_{i} - e\left( y \right) \right)}} \\
r_{xy} & = & \frac{\text{cov}\left( x,y \right)}{\sqrt{d\left( x \right)}\sqrt{d\left( y \right)}} \\
\end{array}$$

Figs [13](#pone.0184586.g013){ref-type="fig"} and [14](#pone.0184586.g014){ref-type="fig"} show image "Flower" and "Cablecar" correlation of two adjacent pixels. [Table 3](#pone.0184586.t003){ref-type="table"} provides more tests of the correlations, which show that two adjacent pixels in the plain images are highly correlated while the cipher images showed negligible correlations. The result indicates that our proposed encryption model functions properly.

!["Flower" image correlation of two adjacent pixels.\
(a) the distribution of two horizontal adjacent pixels in the original image, (b) the distribution of two horizontal adjacent pixels in the encryption image, (c) the distribution of two vertically adjacent pixels in the original image, (d) the distribution of two vertically adjacent pixels in the encryption image, (e) the distribution of two diagonally adjacent pixels in the original image, and (f) the distribution of two diagonally adjacent pixels in the encryption image.](pone.0184586.g013){#pone.0184586.g013}

!["Cablecar" image correlation of two adjacent pixels.\
(a) the distribution of two horizontal adjacent pixels in the original image, (b) the distribution of two horizontal adjacent pixels in the encryption image, (c) the distribution of two vertically adjacent pixels in the original image, (d) the distribution of two vertically adjacent pixels in the encryption image, (e) the distribution of two diagonally adjacent pixels in the original image and (f) the distribution of two diagonally adjacent pixels in the encryption image.](pone.0184586.g014){#pone.0184586.g014}

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t003

###### Correlation coefficients of original images and encryption images.

![](pone.0184586.t003){#pone.0184586.t003g}

  Encryption algorithm                       Horizontal   Vertical   Diagonal
  ------------------------------------------ ------------ ---------- -----------
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref020]\] algorithm   0.0681       0.0845     \-
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref022]\] algorithm   -0.0318      0.0965     0.0362
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref024]\] algorithm   0.0051       -0.0093    -0.0205
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref026]\] algorithm   0.0086       0.0195     -0.0093
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref040]\] algorithm   -0.00164     0.01304    -0.01911
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref041]\] algorithm   0.0773       0.0770     -0.0.0693
  *Proposed algorithm "Flower"*              -0.0062      0.0052     0.0043
  *Proposed algorithm "Cablecar"*            -0.0061      0.0070     0.0102

### Information entropy analysis {#sec014}

Information entropy is thought to be one of the most important features of randomness. To measure the entropy, *H*(*m*), of a source *m*, the following equation can be employed: $$H\left( m \right) = - \sum\limits_{i = 0}^{2^{n} - 1}{p\left( m_{i} \right)\log_{2}p\left( m_{i} \right)}$$ where *p*(*m*~*i*~) represents the probability of symbol *m*~*i*~, and the entropy is expressed in bits. For example, when *n* = 8, the image color strength value is *m* = {*m*~0~, ......, *m*~255~}. For a random process, each symbol has equal probability, *p*(*m*~*i*~) = 1/256, *H*(*m*) = 8. In general, the entropy value of the message is smaller than 8 but should to be close to ideal. [Table 4](#pone.0184586.t004){ref-type="table"} provides a comparison of average entropy values for a considerable number of images for the proposed method and some other methods. We noticed that our scheme outperforms other schemes and approaches the ideal value of 8.

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t004

###### Information entropy of ciphered images with three color components.
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  Encryption algorithm                       red      green    blue
  ------------------------------------------ -------- -------- --------
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref020]\] algorithm   7.9732   7.9750   7.9715
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref022]\] algorithm   7.9851   7.9852   7.9832
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref023]\] algorithm   7.9991   7.9990   7.9989
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref026]\] algorithm   7.9971   7.9968   7.9974
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref041]\] algorithm   7.9974   7.9966   7.9975
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref042]\] algorithm   7.9808   7.9811   7.9814
  *Proposed algorithm "Flower"*              7.9993   7.9992   7.9987
  *Proposed algorithm "Cablecar"*            7.9972   7.9975   7.9972

Differential attack {#sec015}
-------------------

Cryptanalysis features an important method called differential attack to crack the encryption algorithm in order to quantitatively measure the influence of a one--pixel change on the cipher image. This influence can be measured via the number of pixel change rate (NPCR) and the unified averaged changing intensity (UACI), which are computed with the following formula: $$\begin{array}{rcl}
{NPCR} & = & {\frac{\sum\limits_{i,j}{D\left( i,j \right)}}{W \times H} \times 100\%} \\
{UACI} & = & {\frac{1}{W \times H}\left( \sum\limits_{i,j}\frac{|{C\left( i,j \right) - C^{\prime}\left( i,j \right)}|}{255} \right) \times 100\%} \\
\end{array}$$ where *W* and *H* represent the width and height of the image, respectively. *C*(*i*, *j*) and *C*′(*i*, *j*) are the ciphered images before and after one pixel of the plain image is changed. For position (*i*, *j*), if *C*(*i*, *j*) ≠ *C*′(*i*, *j*), then *D*(*i*, *j*) = 1; else *D*(*i*, *j*) = 0. We tested the NPCR and UACI values for images Flower and Cablecar for the proposed scheme. As shown in Tables [5](#pone.0184586.t005){ref-type="table"} and [6](#pone.0184586.t006){ref-type="table"}, the proposed scheme is very sensitive with small changes in the plain image. This result shows that our scheme can resist differential attack well.

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t005

###### NPCR of ciphered image.
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  NPCR                                       red       green     blue
  ------------------------------------------ --------- --------- ---------
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref023]\] algorithm   99.6239   99.6216   99.6236
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref027]\] algorithm   99.5445   99.5875   99.5374
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref029]\] algorithm   99.6155   99.6536   99.6475
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref041]\] algorithm   99.6399   99.6002   99.5773
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref042]\] algorithm   99.6170   99.6002   99.5925
  *Proposed algorithm "Flower"*              99.6002   99.6063   99.5834
  *Proposed algorithm "Cablecar"*            99.6140   99.6094   99.5926

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t006

###### UACI of ciphered image.
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  UACI                                      red       green     blue
  ----------------------------------------- --------- --------- ---------
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref023]\]algorithm   33.6623   33.6827   33.6754
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref027]\]algorithm   34.3174   34.1786   33.6467
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref029]\]algorithm   33.6970   34.3251   32.2345
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref041]\]algorithm   33.5916   33.5010   33.4853
  Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref042]\]algorithm   33.4252   33.5898   33.4466
  *Proposed algorithm "Flower"*             33.3635   33.4891   33.5000
  *Proposed algorithm "Cablecar"*           33.4828   33.2790   33.4992

Known plaintext attack and chosen plaintext attack {#sec016}
--------------------------------------------------

The diffusion key stream K~*j*~, in [Eq (12)](#pone.0184586.e027){ref-type="disp-formula"}, not only depends on the security key (initial conditions of 3-cell QCNN, *P*~1~(0), *P*~2~(0), *P*~3~(0), *ϕ*~1~(0), *ϕ*~2~(0), *ϕ*~3~(0)) but also on the plain image itself. Hence, when the same security key encrypts different images, the diffusion key streams are different. Therefor it is ineffective on input an all "0" or all "1" image into this scheme. Accordingly, our scheme can resist known plaintext attack and chosen plaintext attack.

Encryption quality analysis {#sec017}
---------------------------

In an ideal cryptographic model, encrypted images should have uniform histogram distribution to hide pixels relevant information. It implies the encryption algorithm changes the the cipher pixel value to make the probability of each cipher pixel being totally uniform. Literature \[[@pone.0184586.ref043]\] gives a method for estimating the encryption quality, deviation from uniform histogram(*D*~*H*~), which is given by [Eq (14)](#pone.0184586.e035){ref-type="disp-formula"}. $$\begin{array}{r}
{D_{H} = \frac{\sum_{C_{i}}^{255}{\text{|}\text{H}_{C_{i}}{\text{-}}\text{H}_{C}\text{|}}}{M \times N}} \\
\end{array}$$ In [Eq (14)](#pone.0184586.e035){ref-type="disp-formula"}, *M* × *N* is the image size and *C*~*i*~ is the image pixel gray or color level, *C*~*i*~ ∈ \[0, 255\]. H~*Ci*~ is the histogram value at index i, and H~*C*~ is the actual histogram of encrypted image. The smaller *D*~*H*~ value indicates the more uniform histogram distribution and the higher encryption quality.

We obtain *D*~*H*~ comparison reports for three images through using our algorithm with other chaotic encryption algorithms in Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref025]\]. As can be seen from [Table 7](#pone.0184586.t007){ref-type="table"}, all *D*~*H*~ values are very low. Moreover, our algorithm has more uniform histogram distribution and better encryption quality than Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref010], [@pone.0184586.ref013], [@pone.0184586.ref025], [@pone.0184586.ref044]\].

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t007

###### Deviation from uniform histogram(*D*~*H*~).
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  Image      Proposed algorithm   Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref010]\]   Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref013]\]   Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref025]\]   Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref044]\]
  ---------- -------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------
  Peppers    0.0492               0.0938                           0.0979                           0.0917                           0.0977
  Airplane   0.0518               0.0969                           0.0995                           0.0983                           0.0943
  Boat       0.0524               0.0902                           0.0995                           0.0958                           0.0985

Chi-square test {#sec018}
---------------

A Chi-squared test \[[@pone.0184586.ref045], [@pone.0184586.ref046]\], also written as *X*^2^ test, is any statistical hypothesis test wherein the sampling distribution of the test statistic is a chi-squared distribution when the null hypothesis is true. Chi-squared test illustrate the possibility of statistical attacks. To evaluate if and what extent distribution of encrypted image histograms approach the features of a uniform distribution, Chi-squared tests are computed for 7 cipher images' histograms, and then are summarized in [Table 8](#pone.0184586.t008){ref-type="table"}. We find the histograms of the encrypted images are fairly uniform, so the proposed scheme can defend statistical attack.

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t008

###### Chi-square test results for encrypted images.
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  Test Image   *X*^2^ P-value   Decision on H~0~
  ------------ ---------------- ------------------
  Cablecar     0.710            Accepted
  Cornfield    0.969            Accepted
  Peppers      0.791            Accepted
  Airplane     0.321            Accepted
  Fruits       0.580            Accepted
  Boat         0.679            Accepted
  Yacht        0.684            Accepted

NIST SP800-22 test {#sec019}
------------------

NIST SP800-22 test \[[@pone.0184586.ref047]\] includes 16 test methods, which are used to analyse the randomness of binary sequences generated by cipher systems. We performed all the 16 tests for 65536--8 bits key stream sequence and the results are shown in [Table 9](#pone.0184586.t009){ref-type="table"}. From the [Table 9](#pone.0184586.t009){ref-type="table"}, it shows that our scheme goes through all NIST SP800-22 tests successfully. Therefore, the key stream sequence is absolutely random in our scheme.

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t009

###### NIST SP800-22 tests results for encrypted key.
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  Test name                              P-value   Result
  --------------------------- ---------- --------- ---------
  Frequency                              0.9801    Success
  Block-frequency                        0.2775    Success
  Runs                                   0.3160    Success
  Long runs of ones                      0.3954    Success
  Rank                                   0.0296    Success
  Spectral DFT                           0.1550    Success
  No overlapping templates               0.9967    Success
  Overlapping templates                  0.4514    Success
  Universal                              0.6556    Success
  Linear complexity                      0.9056    Success
  Serial                      P-value1   0.9266    Success
  Serial                      P-value2   0.7865    Success
  Approximate entropy                    0.6375    Success
  Cumulative sums forward                0.5436    Success
  Cumulative sums reverse                0.5651    Success
  Random excursions           X = -4     0.7220    Success
                              X = -3     0.7752    Success
                              X = -2     0.2677    Success
                              X = -1     0.2656    Success
                              X = 1      0.1007    Success
                              X = 2      0.3482    Success
                              X = 3      0.4977    Success
                              X = 4      0.5168    Success
  Random excursions variant   X = -9     0.2492    Success
                              X = -8     0.1723    Success
                              X = -7     0.2026    Success
                              X = -6     0.4146    Success
                              X = -5     0.4073    Success
                              X = -4     0.3178    Success
                              X = -3     0.3753    Success
                              X = -2     0.6367    Success
                              X = -1     0.4315    Success
                              X = 1      0.6596    Success
                              X = 2      0.7163    Success
                              X = 3      0.6525    Success
                              X = 4      0.4903    Success
                              X = 5      0.3089    Success
                              X = 6      0.2110    Success
                              X = 7      0.1905    Success
                              X = 8      0.1267    Success
                              X = 9      0.1269    Success

Encryption speed and computation complexity {#sec020}
-------------------------------------------

The encryption speed is an important issue for a well applicable encryption system. Nevertheless, it depends on many factors as hardware, software and programming \[[@pone.0184586.ref025]\]. Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref024], [@pone.0184586.ref048]\] have performed encryption speed tests for some algorithms in \[[@pone.0184586.ref005], [@pone.0184586.ref007], [@pone.0184586.ref024], [@pone.0184586.ref048]--[@pone.0184586.ref052]\] at the same enviorment. From Ref \[[@pone.0184586.ref048]\], we know that the encryption speed of algorithm \[[@pone.0184586.ref005], [@pone.0184586.ref007], [@pone.0184586.ref048], [@pone.0184586.ref049]\] are \>10s, 2.3s, 1.25s, and 2.901s respectively. The execution time of scheme in \[[@pone.0184586.ref024], [@pone.0184586.ref050]--[@pone.0184586.ref052]\] are 155ms, 173ms, 2.089s and 334ms \[[@pone.0184586.ref024]\]. In our scheme, Arnold mapping iteration times *t*~*j*~ in [Eq (11)](#pone.0184586.e022){ref-type="disp-formula"}, is randomness for improving security, so it is hard to build a baseline to compare encryption speed with other methods, especially programming skill and code optimization \[[@pone.0184586.ref025]\]. So we give the encryption speed with different Arnold mapping iteration times in [Table 10](#pone.0184586.t010){ref-type="table"}, and the environment is Microsoft Windows 7, Matlab8.4, a laptop with an Intel Xeon CPU E3-1220 v3 3.10GHz, 8.00GB RAM. As can be seen from the [Table 10](#pone.0184586.t010){ref-type="table"}, our scheme has an acceptable speed.

10.1371/journal.pone.0184586.t010

###### The speed range for the proposed algorithm.
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  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Image       Iteration 1\     Iteration 10\     Iteration 20\     Iteration 30\     Iteration 40\     Iteration 50\
              time Speed(ms)   times Speed(ms)   times Speed(ms)   times Speed(ms)   times Speed(ms)   times Speed(ms)
  ----------- ---------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- -----------------
  Peppers     103              368               666               960               1261              1554

  Cablecar    102              359               644               931               1215              1501

  Airplane    104              372               666               959               1256              1550

  Cornfield   101              358               646               934               1214              1512

  Boat        101              371               668               960               1256              1553

  Fruits      102              363               655               931               1216              1528

  Yacht       101              358               644               932               1215              1504
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additionally, the computation complexity relies on the number of operations and steps to fulfill the encryption. Our scheme needs $\mathcal{O}\left( \text{n} \right)$ to complete the entire encryption process, where n is the pixel number of images. Thus, the efficiency of the proposed algorithm is competent in the application level encryption requirements.

Conclusion {#sec021}
==========

In this paper, a semi-symmetric image encryption scheme based on function projective synchronization between two hyperchaotic systems is proposed, and it has several advantages such as great speed, relatively low complexity compared respectively to symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. Especially, the key is generated simultaneously in encryption side and decryption side independently, which effectively avoids the key transmission and threats of key exposure. The presented scheme is a hybrid chaotic encryption algorithm and it consists of a scrambling stage and a diffusion stage. Moreover, the 6^*th*^-order CNN is not only regarded as the drive system for the key synchronization, but also is used for diffusing key generation to enhance the security and sensitivity of the scheme. The simulation experiments and security performance analyses show that our scheme has a satisfactory security performance.

Supporting information {#sec022}
======================

###### "Flower" original image.
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###### "Cablecar" original image.
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###### "Airplane" original image.
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###### "Boat" original image.
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###### "Cornfield" original image.
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###### "Fruits" original image.
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###### "Peppers" original image.
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###### "Yacht" original image.
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